

Message Text

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FOR GARRISON FROM MATLOCK

E.O. 11652: GDS
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SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL

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IN VIEW OF YOUR CURRENT PROJECT ON NATIONALITIES, WE HAVE
PREPARED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT. SINCE IT
MAKES POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, IT SHOULD BE SUBMITTED ONLY
WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S APPROVAL. PLEASE CHECK WITH HIM TO
SEE IF HE CONCURS, AND IF HE DOES WE SHALL SEND REGULAR
CHANNEL.

1. SOVIET NATIONAL MINORITIES: CURRENT SITUATION. IN
THE REFERENCED AIRGRAMS, THE EMBASSY SUMMARIZED ITS
SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS ON THE SOVIET NATIONALITY QUESTION
AND SET OUT ITS PRESENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS
NATIONALISM CAUSES THE REGIME.

-- THE FIRST CATEGORY OF PROBLEMS STEMS FROM THE EXISTENCE
OF ENDURING AND OFTEN WIDELY DIFFERING HERITAGES AMONG
SOVIET NATIONALITIES. THIS LEADS TO A VARIETY OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO REGIME GOALS. SUCH
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PHENOMENA AS FAMILY SIZE, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, SOCIAL AND
GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY HINDER POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE
REGIME AND WILL CONTINUE PARTICULARLY TO AFFECT THE SOVIET
LABOR FORCE AND MILITARY MANPOWER BASE. THE SOVIETS HAVE
LITTLE DIRECT CONTROL OVER THESE PHENOMENA UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES AND, AS BREZHNEV MADE CLEAR AT THE OCTOBER
1977 SUPREME SOVIET SESSION, NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

ARE TO BE ACCEPTED AS A "GIVEN" FOR DOMESTIC POLICY IN THE NEAR TERM.

-- THE SECOND CATEGORY OF PROBLEMS CONSISTS OF THOSE WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD CONSIDER URGENT AND REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. AMONG THEM WE WOULD INCLUDE SUCH PROBLEMS AS NATIONALISTIC DISSENT, AND MANIFESTATIONS OF NATIONALISM WHICH THREATEN MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE ARMY OR RATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR FORCE.

2. IN OUR VIEW, THE PROBLEMS NATIONALISM CURRENTLY POSES FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TEND TO FALL WITHIN THE FIRST CATEGORY AND ARE, THEREFORE, MORE PASSIVE THAN ACTIVE. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT SEE NATIONALISM IN ANY OF THE REPUBLICS AS AN URGENT, IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR THE LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE SOME AREAS - THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, THE WESTERN UKRAINE AND GEORGIA - WHERE NATIONALISM APPEARS TO BE RELATIVELY ACTIVE, AND THERE ARE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN MANY OTHER AREAS. IN THESE AREAS, THE LEADERSHIP FACES ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, RACIAL, MILITARY AND PARTY PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE, AT LEAST THEORETICALLY, THE POTENTIAL FOR ACTIVATING NATIONALITY ISSUES WHICH WOULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE, HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION.

3. PROSPECTS FOR THE NATIONAL MINORITIES. WHILE THE REGIME MIGHT PREFER, IDEALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL FOR NATIONALLY-ORIENTED BEHAVIORS WHICH COULD DAMAGE ITS ABILITY TO ACHIEVE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES, THE CURRENT
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LEADERSHIP SEEMS WELL AWARE OF THE POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE NATURE OF NATIONALITY ISSUES AND APPEARS CONTENT, FOR LACK OF ANY BETTER ALTERNATIVE, TO TRY TO ESTABLISH "OBJECTIVE" SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WHICH OVER THE VERY LONG TERM THEY HOPE WILL ROB NATIONALITY DIFFERENCES OF THEIR POLITICAL SALIENCE, IF NOT ELIMINATE THEM ALTOGETHER.

4. NATIONALITY DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE SHORTER RUN - THE NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS - WILL BE CONSTRAINED BY THE REALITY OF THE OVERWHELMING CAPABILITY OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON THE MINORITY NATIONALITIES AND BY THEIR WILLINGNESS, IF PRESSED, TO USE THAT CAPABILITY. WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE POWER AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY CIRCUMSTANCES SHORT OF SEVERE MILITARY REVERSES IN WAR OR AN UNPRECEDENTED SERIES OF ECONOMIC DISASTERS. BOTH ARE SUFFICIENTLY REMOTE CONTINGENCIES, IN OUR VIEW, AS NOT TO PLAY A SERIOUS ROLE IN PLANNING US POLICY.

5. IF THE CONTINUATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF OVERWHELMING SOVIET CENTRAL POWER IS CLEAR, THE CONTINUED WILLINGNESS OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES TO USE THAT POWER SEEMS ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE QUESTIONABLE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT A

REFORMIST, POST-BREZHNEV REGIME (ASSUMING ONE SHOULD EVENTUALLY COME TO POWER) MIGHT BE LESS WILLING TO USE FORCE TO IMPOSE ITS WILL, OR MIGHT BE PERCEIVED AS LESS WILLING BY MEMBERS OF SOVIET MINORITY NATIONALITIES. UNDER THE LATTER CIRCUMSTANCES, THE EVENTS OF EASTERN EUROPE IN 1956, OR OF PRAGUE IN 1968, CONCEIVABLY MIGHT PLAY THEMSELVES OUT AGAIN WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, MOST LIKELY WITH SIMILARLY TRAGIC RESULTS.

6. WE THINK IT MORE PLAUSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT OPEN

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NATIONALITY CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE TO BE REPRESSED AND TO BE PERCEIVED BY MOST MEMBERS OF MINORITY NATIONALITIES AS COSTLY AND FUTILE. NATIONALITY CONFLICTS ARE LIKELY TO MANIFEST THEMSELVES BEHIND THE SCENES, IN SUCH AREAS AS COMPETITION FOR SCARE RESOURCES, OR INSISTENCE ON CULTURAL EXPRESSION AND USE OF NATIVE LANGUAGE. PARTICULARLY IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE SLOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH THAN THAT TO WHICH IT HAS BEEN ACCUSTOMED, AS SEVERAL STUDIES HAVE SUGGESTED, SUCH INTERNAL POLITICAL CONFLICTS ARE LIKELY TO BECOME MORE INTENSE AND TO COMMAND MORE OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP'S ATTENTION, AS DISTRIBUTION ISSUES BECOME MORE SALIENT. RELATIVELY LESS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR INVESTMENT, AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES MAY DICTATE LOCATING IT IN AREAS IN SIBERIA, WHILE POLITICAL PRIORITIES AND THE AVAILABILITY OF A LABOR SURPLUS WOULD DRGUE FOR DIRECTING IT TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA.

7. PERCEPTIONS OF DISTRIBUTION INEQUITIES, WHICH UP TO NOW DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN FEELINGS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY (WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MEAT-EXPORTING BALTIC STATES), COULD BE SUPERIMPOSED ON AWARENESS OF LINGUISTIC, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES TO PRODUCE AMONG MINORITY NATIONALITIES GREATER ALIENATION FROM THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE EOWER REALITIES ARE SUCH THAT THESE FEELINGS ARE

UNLIKELY TO BENDRANSMUTED INTO WIDESPREAD ORGANIZED
RESISTANCE, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY PRODUCE OCCASIONAL ANOMIC
BEHAVIORS - RIOTS, SMALL-SCALE SABOTAGE, GREATER PERSONAL
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HOSTILITY TOWARD RUSSIANS. MOREOVER, PRESSURES IN THIS
DIRECTION WILL BE AT LEAST PARTLY, AND PERHAPS FULLY,
COUNTER-BALANCED BY PROCESSES OF ASSIMILATION SUCH AS
INTERMARRIAGE, AND PERSONAL ECONOMIC OR PROFESSIONAL
ADVANCEMENT, REINFORCED BY THE BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM A
NATION-WIDE DIVISION OF LABOR WHICH MAY BE DEFENSIBLE ON
GROUNDS OF SIMPLE ECONOMIC RATIONALITY.

8. U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES. AS INDICATED IN THE
DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN
THE USSR (77 STATE 295597), THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF
THE U.S. VIS-A-VIS THE USSR ARE:

-- STRENGTHENED BILATERAL AND OTHER RRMS CONTROL
EFFORTS.

-- CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

-- PROJECTION OF U.S. VIEWS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND
PEOPLE.

-- EXPOSURE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS.

-- IMPROVED BILATERAL ATMOSPHERE AND TRADE.

9. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS, WE
BELIEVE THAT THE CONTINUATION OF A CONSCIOUSNESS OF
NATIONAL IDENTITY WITHIN THE NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS OF THE
USSR IS ALSO IN THE U.S. INTEREST. THIS IS PARTICULARLY
TRUE INSOFAR AS THESE NATIONAL DIFFERENCES ENGENDER SOME
UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ABOUT THE
ULTIMATE LOYALTY OF THE REGIME'S MINORITY NATIONALITIES
AND THEREFORE EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON ITS
FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR. FORMULATING AND IMPLEMENTING A
U.S. POLICY OF ENCOURAGING THE CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN THE NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS, HOWEVER,
REQUIRES A DEGREE OF DELICACY WHICH OUR PRESENT LEVEL OF
KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT READILY PERMIT. TO GIVE AN EXTREME
EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE BOTH UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNDESIRABLE
IN TERMS OF THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL U.S. INTERESTS WE HAVE
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CITED FOR US TO CONTRIBUTE UNWITTINGLY TO A HUNGARY 1956-
TYPE SITUATION IN ONE OF THE MINORITY REPUBLICS.

A LESS EXTREME OUTCOME TO A POORLY CONCEIVED POLICY
MIGHT BE THE RE-AWAKENING OF A MORE CHAUVINISTIC FORM OF
RUSSIAN NATIONALISM, A POSSIBILITY WHICH WE HAVE DISCUSSED
IN REFAIRS AND WHICH ALSO SEEMS TO US NOT IN THE U.S.

INTEREST.

10. WE FIND OUR TASK ANALOGOUS, THEREFORE, TO THAT WHICH CONFRONTS U.S. POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE - TO ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS OVER THE LONG-TERM BY CAREFUL AND INDIRECT MEASURES WHICH TRY TO AVOID PRODUCING SITUATIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO LARGE-SCALE REPRESSION. A POLICY WHICH GOES BEYOND THESE GOALS AND ATTEMPTS TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WITH URGENT, IMMEDIATE NATIONALITY PROBLEMS IS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED AND, IN THE UNLIKELY EVENTUALITY THAT IT DID, WOULD NOT ADVANCE MORE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS, AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO HARSH DOMESTIC REPRESSION. IN DEALING WITH INTERNAL DISSENT - WHETHER BASED ON NATIONALISTIC, "REFUSENIK," RELIGIOUS OR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS - THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO HAVE A SHORT FUSE AND A LONG ARM. NO "PRAGUE SPRING" IS LIKELY IN THE SOVIET UNION AS LONG AS THE VIEWPOINT OF THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP PREVAILS.

11. SPECIFIC POLICY SUGGESTIONS. THERE A NUMBER OF TANGIBLE, BUT NOT PARTICULARLY CONTROVERSIAL STEPS THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN THE NATIONAL MINORITIES, PAR-

TICULARLY BY INCREASING THE ATTENTION IT PAYS TO THEM.

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-- FIRST, WE SHOULD DEVEMP AND MAINTAIN WITHIN THE USG A CAPACITY TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MORE IMPORTANT MINORITY AREAS BY HAVING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING PUBLICATIONS IN THESE LANGUAGES. AT PRESENT, WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE USG HAS THE CAPACITY YM KEEP AN EYE ON INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN THE EIGHT OR TEN KEY MINORITY AREAS.

-- REGARDING USG SPONSORED BROADCASTING IN SOVIET

MINORITY LANGUAGES, OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE LANGUAGE COVERAGE AND TIME DEVOTED TO THIS ACTIVITY IS ABOUT RIGHT FOR BOTH VOA AND RL. HOWEVER, STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND RELEVANCE OF THE NON-RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BROADCASTS, AND THIS WILL REQUIRE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF AMERICAN SUPERVISERS WHO HAVE A KNOWLEDGE OF THE LANGUAGES IN QUESTION.

-- EFFORTS COULD BE MADE TO EXPAND THE ITINERARY OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITING DELEGATIONS, BOTH CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE, BEYOND THE USUAL LENINGRAD-MOSCOW CIRCUIT (ALTHOUGH NOT TO THE THREE BALTIC CAPITALS, WITHOUT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF OUR "NON-RECOGNITION" POLICY). WE BELIEVE THAT VISITS TO REPUBLIC CAPITALS WOULD RECEIVE FAR GREATER LOCAL ATTENTION THAN THEY RECEIVE IN THE MORE JADED PRESENT AND FORMER CAPITALS OF THE COUNTRY.

-- AS SOON AS THE GENERAL STATE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ALLOWS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER TAKING ACTIVE STEPS TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S. CONSULATE IN TASHKENT.
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FOR ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC REASONS, CENTRAL ASIA SHOULD BE THE SITE OF OUR NEXT CONSULATE AND UZBEKISTAN, WITH THE LARGEST POPULATION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS, IS THE LOGICAL CHOICE. MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE OUR CONSULATE IN KIEV IS OPENED, BUT THE LEADTIME IN ESTABLISHING OFFICES HERE IS SO GREAT THAT IT IS NONE TOO SOON TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON A THIRD CONSULATE IN TASHKENT. INITIATING SUCH TALKS WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST IN EXPANDING CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS, AND MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE AN ADVANCE PARTY IN PLACE BY 1979 OR 1980.

-- THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS COULD ALSO BE EXPANDED BY ENCOURAGING U.S. SCHOLARS TO STUDY IN THEM. FEW OF THOSE WHO SPEND EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME STUDYING IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF LENINGRAD AND MOSCOW. IF THEY WERE, RECENT EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL DIRECT SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO THE EMBASSY AND MAKE INFORMED CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARLY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLICS UPON THEIR RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES. WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND A WAY TO SELECT AND FUND QUALIFIED PEOPLE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN STUDYING IN THE REPUBLICS.

-- IN ORDER TO SUPPORT MORE INTENSIVE PRIVATE U.S. STUDY OF THE MINORITY AREAS, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO FEDERAL FUNDING OF GRADUATE STUDY AND RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. SUCH AS THE UKRAINIAN RESEARCH CENTER AT

HARVARD AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN PROGRAM AT COLUMBIA.
WITHOUT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
STUDY PROGRAMS ON THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES WILL HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO PRODUCE THE SPECIALISTS WE NEED IN THIS AREA.

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12. CONCLUSION. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET
MINORITY NATIONALITY QUESTION BE KEPT IN PROPER PERSPEC-
TIVE. THERE ARE OTHER ISSUES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION
WHICH TOUCH FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL U.S. INTERESTS.
MOREOVER, U.S. ABILITY TO AFFECT SOVIET NATIONALITY
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY BY MEANS CONSONANT WITH OUR
MORE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES, IS VERY LIMITED AND LIKELY
TO REMAIN SO. WITHIN THIS FRAME WORK, HOWEVER, THERE
EXISTS A GENUINE U.S. INTEREST IN THE CONTINUATION OF
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN THE MINORITY REPUBLICS AND
SOME TOOLS, SUCH AS THOSE DISCUSSED ABOVE, TO FURTHER
THAT INTEREST. MATLOCK

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